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Liberalism and Epistemic diversity: Mill’s sceptical legacy 
 
Paul Kelly 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
Abstract: Although J.S.Mill places considerable emphasis on three 
information signalling devices - debate, votes and prices - he remains 
curiously sceptical about the prospects of institutional or social 
epistemology. In this paper I explore Mill's modest scepticism about 
institutional epistemology and compare and contrast that with the attitude of 
liberal theorists such as F.A. Hayek and John Dewey who are much more 
enthusiastic about the prospects of social epistemology as part of their 
defences of liberalism. The paper examines the extent to which Hayek and 
Dewey ignore concerns originally raised by Mill. I conclude that Mill's 
modes scepticism is reflected in the epistemological abstinence of 
contemporary liberal philosophers such as John Rawls, and that his elevation 
of philosophy over democracy remains a challenge to contemporary 
defenders of the political value of social or institutional epistemology. 
 
In whatever way contemporary liberalism seeks to abandon methods and 
arguments posed by earlier thinkers it remains implicated in problems that 
were raised in Mill’s complex and pregnant writings of the mid nineteenth-
century. Yet ever since the nineteenth century there have been liberals 
thinkers who cast doubts upon Mill’s canonical position. Many classical 
liberals accuse him of apostasy for his separation of social and political 
liberalism from economic liberalism.1   The distinction that Mill draws in his 
writings on political economy between issues of production and exchange, 
and questions of distribution with the implication that the latter can be a 
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matter of public political deliberation gave rise to a rupture in the tradition 
that later thinkers such as Hayek and those influenced by him came to regard 
as a step on the road to Socialism. Other later liberals regard Mill’s 
utilitarian philosophical foundations as ultimately corrosive of the liberal 
principles of freedom and equality that he claims to aspire to.2 Mill’s 
preoccupation with distinctions between quantity and quality of pleasures 
and attempts to derive a robust defence of liberty from considerations of 
welfare maximisation seem curiously anachronistic in the face of a 
contractualist liberalism that Mill would have found deeply puzzling. Yet 
although it appears that the subsequent development of liberalism into the 
twentieth century involves a progressive abandonment of Mill’s ideas and 
approach, we can nevertheless argue that the subsequent development of 
liberalism, passing through Hayek and Dewey to the likes of John Rawls in 
the late twentieth century reflects concerns that are central to Mill. That in it 
self is not a particularly novel claim. Yet in this paper I will offer a different 
version of this claim by focusing on a concern of Mill’s that is largely 
overlooked in contemporary discussions. This concern is embodied in Mill’s 
modest scepticism about the claims of social epistemology and his 
appreciation of the political problem of maintaining epistemic diversity in 
the face of positional advantage and vested interests. I intend to claim that 
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whilst contemporary political liberalism differs markedly from Mill’s 
comprehensive doctrine, it retains his modest scepticism about social 
epistemology and his awareness of the problem of maintaining epistemic 
diversity, and this is an important lesson as less sceptical liberal theorists 
such as Hayek or Dewey enjoy a resurgence of interest amongst 
contemporary democratic theorists.  
 
Mill on Epistemic Diversity 
The problem of social epistemology and the related condition of epistemic 
diversity plays an important role in Mill’s naturalistic social and political 
theory and in his philosophy of science and of man. As, what would now be 
called a ‘comprehensive’ liberal, Mill’s defence of liberal political principles 
forms part of a wider philosophical vision, which includes claims about how 
each knowing subject comes to have the beliefs they have, and what are the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for those beliefs being true. Mill’s 
fundamental epistemological position falls squarely into the empiricist 
tradition and rejects the rationalism and intuitionism of contemporaries such 
as Sir William Hamilton.3 His philosophy of science is fundamentally 
inductivist although Mill gives a significant role to deduction from empirical 
generalisations in his conception of the nature and practice natural and social 
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science. Yet there is also recognition in Mill’s work, that institutions might 
also play a role in pooling diverse information and might thus assist in the 
growth of knowledge and the dissemination of true beliefs. Mill’s utilitarian 
approach to philosophy suggests that the growth of knowledge is itself a 
condition of human happiness and flourishing. In so far as institutions might 
have a role in bringing together diverse sources of information they must 
play an important role in his philosophy. The social or institutional 
dimension of epistemology is fundamental to Mill’s pursuit of truth, 
happiness and progress. Yet it is clear that Mill is far less sanguine about the 
prospects and benefits of social epistemology than many later thinkers.  
 
By way of examining Mill’s complex attitude to social epistemology and its 
implications for the subsequent development of liberalism we can identify 
three important mechanisms by which these diverse sources of information 
can be transmitted and which feature importantly in Mill’s writings; these 
are through speech and discussion, through the price mechanism of free 
markets and through votes in elections and legislatures.  Anyone with a 
passing familiarity with Mill’s writings will appreciate the importance of 
each epistemic transmission mechanism in aspects of his major writings. In 
the rest of this section I will outline Mill’s attitude to each transition 
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mechanism and argue that the epistemological and political importance of 
each differs in crucial respects. 
a. Speech and discussion 
Mill’s most forthright and unequivocal defence of epistemic diversity is to 
be found in Chapter 2 of the essay On Liberty.4 In this chapter Mill offers a 
defence of the maximum degree of free speech and publication, qualified 
only by a stringent interpretation of the demands of public order. Inciting 
angry mobs or shouting ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre are both ruled as 
legitimate exceptions to the general liberty of speech and discussion, but 
pretty much anything else goes. Although Chapter 2 on On Liberty is 
devoted to speech and opinion, Mill’s argument extends beyond this in the 
subsequent chapter where his ideal of individuality provides a defence of 
free expression of ideals beliefs and values, in ways that may not be covered 
by the more intellectualist defence of free speech and discussion. Although 
the argument for an ideal of individuality in Chapter 3 of On Liberty draws 
on ideas of personal autonomy translated into the language of utilitarianism, 
it is clear that Mill remains committed to individuality as a condition of 
social experimentation designed to progress towards moral truth.5 Mill is not 
concerned with expression for its own sake. Expression in terms of 
experiments in living is concerned with the sincere pursuit of the best form 
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of life and its appreciation as the best form of life for each person. Mill is 
concerned to defend the idea that this question can be given a right answer 
and that there is knowledge to be had in respect of how best one ought to 
live. Mill believed in the idea of moral expertise. Indeed his whole defence 
of the qualitative distinction amongst pleasures in the essay Utilitarianism 
Chapter 2 turns on the idea of moral experts who are able to judge 
qualitatively between pleasures, or more precisely activities that give rise to 
the sensation of pleasure.6 Moral expertise is something that each person can 
in principle acquire through the cultivation of experience and critical 
reflection, however, at any one time not everyone will count as an expert so 
Mill’s doctrine of ethics does leave open the possibility of moral elites based 
on expertise. We shall return to the significance of these elites later on.  
 
It is in this context of seeking the best form of life that Mill’s defence of free 
speech and opinion is developed. Mill is concerned with the acquisition of 
scientific and moral knowledge as the condition of a good or valuable life. 
To this end it is imperative that the pursuit of truth in all areas of enquiry is 
unrestricted as the denial of truth diminishes the stock of value in the world. 
In the justly famous second chapter of On Liberty Mill sums up the case for 
free expression on the following grounds: 
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 First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, 
for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume 
our own infallibility. 
 Secondly, though the silencing opinion be an error, it may, and 
very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general 
or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, 
it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the 
truth has any chance of being supplied. 
 Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the 
whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and 
earnestly contested, it will by most of those who receive it, be held in 
the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its 
rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the 
doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and 
deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma 
becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but 
cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and 
heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.7 
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Mill’s defence of speech is not merely a defence of the individual to say 
things that are considered outrageous from the point of view of traditional 
beliefs and practices. That is certainly the dominant reading of Mill’s 
argument, and it is undoubtedly part of his concern. Since long before Mill’s 
time the Liberal defence of speech, belief and the press, had been concerned 
with saying what is unpopular or uncontroversial. Yet more important even 
than this fundamental Liberal concern is Mill’s assertion of the need to 
engage actively in speech and discussion. It is the active exchange of 
opinions and beliefs and their continual defence against new challenges that 
Mill is also concerned about, hence his otherwise curious argument that even 
those beliefs we hold to be certain and uncontroversial should be challenged 
and defended with new vigour to each person or generation. People should 
not merely have the right to hold and profess beliefs or engage in private 
enquiry in the security of their studies. Unless people actively profess, 
defend and argue for their beliefs the pursuit of knowledge and the task of 
truth testing cannot take place. The liberty principle once applied to free 
speech and discussion should not, therefore, be seen as a purely negative 
restriction on censorship whether this be private or societal. The ideal of 
liberty of speech and discussion is a much more positive or active ideal that 
can only arise once the dead hand of censorship and tradition is removed.  
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Given the importance of diversity of opinion and widespread public 
discussion of all issues and ideas, it is perhaps misleading as many do, to 
claim that Mill believed in a market-place of ideas.8 For although Mill does 
seem to use the market analogy to describe the way in which settled 
convictions about the truth emerges through competition with other beliefs 
and opinions, the market metaphor does not adequately capture the way in 
which Mill wants to actively encourage participation, debate and discussion. 
Even the staunchest defender of the free market is unlikely to see 
participation in market exchange in quite this way. We can therefore, draw a 
fairly clear distinction of priority that Mill affords to speech and discussion 
as a mechanism for the institutional channelling of knowledge and that 
which he attaches to the price mechanism in a free market.  
 
The contrast between the price-mechanism of the free market and Mill’s 
account of the critical importance of widespread debate and exchange of 
beliefs turns on his view of the epistemic value of diversity of beliefs as 
such. The price mechanism attaches differing values to different kinds of 
goods and services. When it works efficiently it directs resources to the most 
profitable areas of activity and away from the least profitable, the price itself 
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serves as a signal of where to invest or spend and where not to. However, 
although high and low prices signal different information, some goods and 
services, as signalled by price will be shown to have little or no value and 
therefore the market mechanism should discourage their production. For 
example there is almost no market currently for Penny Farthing Bicycles so 
almost none are produced. Yet in Mill’s defence of speech and discussion all 
beliefs and opinions have some utility as such, even if they are clearly false. 
Even false beliefs have a contribution to make to the pursuit and 
appreciation of truth. It is not that Mill wants to denigrate the idea of 
genuine knowledge or truth especially in science and ethics, nor does he 
have a consensus or pragmatist theory of truth. Mill simply wanted to argue 
for the epistemic value of diversity of beliefs and opinions even false ones 
and this valuing of diversity is not simply connected to the idea of discourse 
and argument as leading to a deliberative account of the public good or 
interest. Mill’s defence of epistemic diversity is indeed instrumental, but it is 
not instrumental in terms solely of revealing the public interest as many 
contemporary deliberative theorists suggests. We shall return to the 
significance of this shortly. 
b. Prices. 
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Mill’s Principles of Political Economy became the standard textbook on 
economics until the marginalist revolution in the later nineteenth century, 
and it conforms to the main outlines of classical theory. Although Mill goes 
to considerable lengths to add nuance and complexity to the Classical theory 
he inherited from his father and Ricardo on most fundamental issues he 
agrees with his forbears.  This is most clearly illustrated by his endorsement 
of the political economy of laissez-faire. Whilst Mill does not develop an 
ideology of economic liberalism that privileges the role of the market in 
quite the way that later economic liberals such as Hayek does, he does 
endorse a respect for the price mechanism as a way of signalling the 
dispersed information that is necessary for making efficient decisions about 
resource allocation amongst conflicting ends and demands. Willingness to 
pay as reflected in the price mechanism is a clear indicator of individual 
preferences or wants and this in turn is at least one clear indicator of the 
general interest. As a utilitarian, Mill’s defence of market freedom is given 
in terms of the maximisation of utility rather than in Hayekian 
epistemological terms, but in essence the arguments are the same, at least up 
to a point.  
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That point has become one of the main sites of dispute within liberalism 
about Mill’s canonical status. Whilst Mill follows a broadly laissez-faire 
attitude to the economy and government policy, and whilst this can also be 
seen in his political and social philosophy especially when he discusses 
controversial questions such us how far the state should be involved in 
providing education, when he came to discuss questions of distribution in his 
Principles of Political Economy he does suggest that laissez-faire can be 
abandoned. He claims that the economic laws that apply to production 
‘…partake of the character of physical truths…’ but that ‘It is not so with the 
Distribution of Wealth. That is a matter of human institution merely’.10  By 
describing the ‘laws’ of distribution as a human institution he means that 
they are a function of the system of property that obtains in a particular 
society, consequently as those property relations are malleable so the 
structure and principles of distribution can change. This departure is most 
explicit in later editions of the Principles’ where Mill appears to concede 
ground to socialist arguments, at least as these applied to the distribution of 
the product of a Capitalist economy. It should however, be noted that the 
concessions that Mill makes to socialist arguments under the influence of his 
wife Harriet, are hardly significant from the perspective of committed 
socialists, however dangerous Hayekian liberals may have regarded them. 
 13 
There is little or nothing that would have appeared as a significant 
concession to the kinds of ‘scientific’ socialist arguments being developed 
by Marx or Engels. 
 
The implications of Mill’s position in his writings on political economy are 
ambiguous from the point of view of social epistemology and the problem of 
epistemic diversity. Whereas Mill adopts a fully laissez-faire attitude to 
speech and opinion, even to the point of securing the existence of epistemic 
space for false beliefs, when it comes to the sphere in which laissez-faire is 
most commonly advocated by classical liberals, he clearly equivocates. His 
arguments in relation to the Laws of Distribution is that the price mechanism 
might well serve as a signalling device, but it does not fully indicate the 
public good or the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and more 
importantly, this can be derived in other ways that perhaps contradict the 
dictates of the market. Yet if we probe the question of what alternative 
mechanisms Mill proposed instead of the market we can see that Mill’s 
social and political commitment to laissez-faire remains pretty strong. And 
what this suggests is that Mill’s primary understanding of the market is not 
as a signalling mechanism for the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
or for constituting the public good but as a regime of liberty. When Mill 
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applies a market or laissez-faire policy to the political realm it is clear that 
his concern is primarily with a fear of Government as a sectional interest 
rather than with any epistemological thesis about computation or the 
technical ability of government to construct policies in the public interest. 
The concern is far less with the technical inability of Government to 
coordinate the myriad sources of knowledge necessary for policy making. 
As an heir to Benthamite utilitarianism and government reform Mill is 
perfectly open to the idea of more efficient and knowledge based policy- 
making. His concern instead is the more fundamental problem political 
motivation rather than the technical question of epistemic ability, this is 
further illustrated in his approach to political institutions and the third 
mechanism used for transmitting social dispersed information, votes. 
c. Votes 
Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government,11 is regarded by both 
liberals and democrats as a deeply unsatisfactory compromise between the 
conflicting demands of legislative expertise and of representative 
accountability. Yet it perfectly illustrates Mill’s preoccupation with social 
epistemology and his concern with securing epistemic diversity against the 
threat of political conformity. Mill’s defence of the vote is interesting in this 
work because it down plays the idea of voting as signalling information or as 
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a way of revealing a preference or judgement in a process of public 
deliberation on the public interest. Instead the vote is used to make a more 
basic judgement of legitimacy rather than a constitutive judgement about the 
common good. To explain why Mill sees the vote in participatory rather than 
deliberative terms we need to go back to an aspect of his moral and political 
theory discussed earlier. 
 
Mill’s distinction between higher and lower pleasures in the essay on 
Utilitarianism introduces the idea of moral expertise.12 The idea is simply 
that some people with more knowledge and experience will be able to 
distinguish between more and less valuable ends. As the more valuable ends 
will bring about greater happiness in the long run and as Mill continues to 
endorse the idea of the greatest happiness as the ultimate criterion of value 
and right action,13 he faces the question of why these moral experts should 
not rule and benignly impose the general interest on the less experienced and 
less knowledgeable. Mill’s second classic essay On Liberty provides part of 
the answer to why there should not be rule by such moral experts and this 
sets the agenda for his democratic theory in Considerations on 
Representative Government. If we return to our brief discussion of On 
Liberty above, it is clear that Mill is sceptical about elite rule for two 
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reasons. The first is the problem of elite selection. Much of Mill’s concern 
about majority tyranny in On Liberty is not merely confined to the familiar 
nineteenth-century worry about democratic levelling and mass man, it is also 
concerned with the argument of his father James Mill that the rule of a 
‘representative class’ the commercial middle class would best secure the 
public interest. Mill’s concern here, is that the self identification of a social 
class or group as embodying the public interest or the greatest happiness is 
dangerous. Mill was sceptical about the virtues of the commercial middle 
class and far from convinced that they were the moral experts that his father 
seemed to suggest. The commercial middle class represent all the dangers of 
self-appointed elites confirming their interest as the public interest, with 
their conservative and narrow view of social convention.  But the most 
important problem is who identifies the elites or experts and how they are 
chosen. Mill was a sufficiently sensitive reader of Plato’s Republic to 
appreciate the problem of how one can secure rule of experts of the 
distribution of expert knowledge is not widely shared. This problem was 
obviously appreciated by those claiming the extension of the franchise 
throughout Mill’s political life, who were far from convinced that the social 
classes that ruled them were actually the social and political elite in anything 
but a positional sense. Secondly, Mill was also concerned about the 
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substance of moral expertise. It is one thing to be open to the idea of moral 
and political experts, but it is quite another thing to identify the content of 
that expertise, and say precisely what moral and political knowledge consists 
in: again Mill’s concern echoes themes from Plato’s Republic, with which 
he would have been familiar through his friendship with George Grote as 
well as his early education.14 Both of these issues come together in the 
arguments of Considerations on Representative Government.  
 
On the franchise, Mill adopts an approach more similar to Bentham’s 
conception of representative democracy than to deliberative or constitutive 
theories of democracy such as found in Rousseau or more recent democratic 
theorists. For Bentham the task of the franchise was not to coordinate 
interests or signal preferences for some social choice function, rather it was 
merely to hold the legislature to account and remove them when they 
seemed to be acting against the general interest. The votes of the majority 
were not intended to signal what the general interest was but merely to 
identify that a particular regime were not acting in accordance with it. 
 
Mill’s argument is more subtle than Bentham’s in this respect as in most 
others, yet he still saw the vote primarily as a judgement of legitimacy rather 
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than a signal of judgement about the general interest or greatest happiness. 
Mill, like Bentham did not equate the opinion of the majority revealed in a 
vote with the greatest happiness of the greatest number in all but exceptional 
cases. Voting remains a checking mechanism for holding the legislature to 
account and the exercise of the franchise serves an important role in the 
moral and political education of those who exercise it. But even though Mill 
thinks that exercising the franchise publicly (as he was against secret ballots) 
would raise the character and judgement of the electorate, he remained 
suspicious of the effect of social and economic interests distorting the 
political process. For this reason he is more concerned with fragmenting 
dominant social and political interests through devices such as proportional 
representation and plural voting, than he was issues of deliberation and 
preference or judgement aggregation. Mill’s institutional concern is 
therefore with undermining stable social majorities and the tendency of 
democracy towards what he saw as populism. It is in relation to the threat of 
populism that Mill made is apparently anti-egalitarian concession to plural-
voting. The point here is that numbers of votes are distributed according to 
educational qualifications on the grounds that the more informed and 
educated electors would be less inclined to support populism and demagogy. 
Proportional representation, of which Mill was an early advocate, has a 
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similar political value. Far from employing mechanisms to pool information 
and knowledge, Mill’s concern is with mechanisms that ensure political 
pluralism and diversity. In this respect it is diversity and pluralism as a 
social phenomena that matters to Mill just as it did in his account of free-
speech and discussion. Again this is not merely because epistemic diversity 
is a good that contributes to the criticism and growth of knowledge, rather it 
is offered as part of the defence against tendencies to social and political 
conformity.15 Epistemic diversity provides part of the check on social 
interests and groups asserting their status as a representative class or as the 
political elite. So once again when Mill appeals to epistemic diversity it is to 
support political and social diversity and hence freedom. The defence is cast 
in political rather than epistemological terms. 
 
However, voting does not only take place in the exercise of the franchise but 
also within legislatures. It might be argued that in this context Mill’s concern 
is less with the protective role of representative democracy and more with 
the deliberative role, where voting might well serve as a signalling device or 
mechanism for transferring dispersed knowledge and expertise. 
 
 20 
But even in the context of legislation, Mill seems to avoid appealing to 
institutional mechanisms as a way of pooling information and knowledge in 
order to secure the public interest. In Considerations’ Mill distinguishes the 
role of elected legislators and the civil service or bureaucracy who initiate 
and develop policy of the legislative to judge and approve. Clearly Mill 
thought that legislators should be intelligent and wiser than their electorate 
as this is what ultimately qualifies them to judge on behalf of their electors. 
That said, he attaches most importance to the civil service or bureaucrats 
who initiate policy and who will be the genuine political elite. It is the small 
group or cadre of bureaucrats who serve as the philosopher kings and 
develop policy based on that expertise, once again illustrating Mill’s view 
that their can be such experts and that there is something for them to be 
experts in. Deliberation will obviously take place amongst this group as they 
develop and initiate policy or proposed legislation, but Mill does not provide 
much discussion of the institutional structures in which this takes place and 
provides no discussion of mechanisms and structures which might make this 
more effective. In so far as Mill seems to have a model it is that of open 
discussion freed from the burdens of having to ‘sell’ policy to an electorate 
or having to initiate policy at the behest of a party manifesto. Again the 
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model seems to be the pluralistic and structure-less one that we can find in 
his defence of free speech and discussion. 
 
Once policy is presented to the legislature for voting and endorsement we 
might seem to be back with epistemological questions about judgement 
aggregation and deliberative democracy. Yet even in this case Mill’s 
concern remains largely protective as the role of the legislature is to set 
checks on the bureaucratic elite acting in its own interest. Mill retains a 
Benthamite suspicion of government, in any of its dimensions, acting as a 
sinister interest apart from the general interest, or imposing its interest as the 
general interest.16 This does involve the legislature making judgements 
about the greatest happiness or public interest, but crucially Mill emphasises 
the checking or legitimating dimension of the judgement, rather than any 
claim that such judgements when aggregated constitute the greatest 
happiness. Mill retains a strong liberal scepticism about the institutions of 
government and their ability to track or constitute the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number. Obviously, as a utilitarian and not a libertarian, Mill’s 
scepticism is qualified. He like Bentham does not want to regard 
Government as always the enemy and always acting against the general 
interest. But equally he wants to avoid the idea that a set of institutions can 
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be constructed that would perfectly track the public interest or the greatest 
happiness. All such institutions will be fallible and therefore they need to be 
regarded with a healthy scepticism. Whilst they may deliver the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number, there will always be cases in which they 
fail to do so. But more important even than this scepticism about social 
epistemology is Mill’s more profound political scepticism. The constant 
danger that the liberal state must protect against is that a particular social 
group could colonise and pervert the functioning of such institutions. This is 
what Bentham feared in characterising government as a sinister interest. The 
government, including both elected representatives, members of the 
executive, but also functionaries such as Judges and civil servants are 
unavoidably an interest apart from those they represent or serve and this is 
because of the way the positions they occupy within the structures of the 
modern state shape and transform their personal or selfish interests. Bentham 
arguably failed to provide a full theory of interest and therefore failed to 
appreciate the social forces that manifest themselves through social and 
political interests. Mill, however seems to have had a much more acute 
appreciation of the problems of social interests and the threat they posed to 
the possibility of a genuinely public interest. This is clearly illustrated at the 
beginning of the essay On Liberty where Mill draws attention to new threats 
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to freedom that cannot be dealt with, as Bentham and all liberals preceding 
him had hoped, merely by the distribution of civil and political rights. 
However, much we might wish to construct institutions that channel and 
signal dispersed knowledge the primary concern of liberals must remain a 
caution about the way in which these institutions can be distorted by 
factional interests.  
 
One should not over-emphasise Mill’s scepticism about the impact of 
political interests acting against the public interest or the greatest happiness, 
as he was undoubtedly optimistic about the growth of knowledge.17 But even 
this progressive optimism depended upon the growth of the right kind of 
character amongst the whole population. Politics could play a part in the 
cultivation of this liberal character and that is certainly one of the concerns 
underlying the institutional design within Considerations on Representative 
Government, but it is interesting that Mill is concerned primarily with the 
cultivation of character and dispositions. He remained profoundly wary of 
the state’s involvement in the cultivation of the intellect or in its imparting 
beliefs and knowledge. For Mill, knowledge was widely dispersed 
throughout society, but it is important for him that it remained widely 
dispersed and that it remained difficult for it to be pooled into any one 
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institutional site or structure. Epistemic diversity remained an end to be 
preserved not overcome. 
 
Epistemic diversity, Millian scepticism and later liberal theory. 
 
The subsequent development of liberal theory in the later nineteenth and 
early twentieth century can be seen to abandon much that preoccupied Mill. 
Idealist liberals such as T.H. Green and ‘new liberals’ such as L.T. 
Hobhouse took up themes in Mill later writings and emphasised the social 
and material conditions of the exercise of freedom as autonomy. Although 
some of these themes are undoubtedly in Mill, they also drew on continental 
sources such as Kant in developing a non-naturalistic and perfectionist 
account of autonomy and freedom. This new tradition came to adopt a much 
more sympathetic attitude to the state as a condition of freedom and human 
flourishing.18 This rapprochement with the state as an active condition of 
freedom and autonomy marked a considerable departure from the sceptical 
classical tradition that we find in Mill, and provided the opportunity for a 
restatement of the classical position by mid-twentieth century liberals such 
as F.A. Hayek. Yet Hayek’s classical turn was not the only response to the 
‘statism’ of new liberalism. John Dewey’s pragmatist liberal theory shared 
 25 
much with the aspirations of new liberalism yet he retained a Millian 
scepticism about the reliance on the state and placed more trust in the 
extension of democracy throughout all aspects of society. 
Hayek and Dewey 
Hayek and Dewey are both important liberal philosophers, but apart from 
sharing that deeply contested title they appear to share very little else in 
common. Hayek is concerned with providing a modern restatement and 
defence of the classical liberal laissez-faire policy of small non-
interventionist government and a strong free market. Dewey’s liberalism is 
based on a commitment to democracy and experimentation in all social 
institutions.19 In many respects Dewey’s liberalism is closer to the liberalism 
of ‘new liberal’ sociologists such as L.T. Hobhouse in Britain, but he differs 
in that his pragmatist philosophy places far greater emphasis on social 
epistemology as the justification for the democratisation of social and 
political institutions. It is this commitment to social epistemology that 
ultimately connects Dewey and Hayek, both of whom, unlike Mill, place 
considerable faith in social epistemology and the institutional dimensions of 
knowledge production. But as we shall see even that enthusiasm is qualified 
by the partial acknowledgement of problems raised by Mill. 
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Throughout his work, F.A. Hayek develops an argument for the free market 
in terms of institutional or social epistemology. As a young man he 
abandoned his early sympathy for social democracy under the influence of 
Ludwig von Mises’s critique if socialism for its inability to mirror the 
complex information processing structure of the free market.20 The effect of 
the calculation debate remained central to Hayek’s later defence of the free 
market and his critique of the welfare state as a stage on the ‘Road to 
Serfdom’. In many of his works this criticism takes on a polemical tone, but 
underlying that was a serious analysis of the way in which institutions could 
serve an epistemological goal.21 For Hayek the problem that socialist 
planners failed to adequately address was the problem of efficiently 
allocating resources in a centrally planned economy. No central state body 
was able to gather the widely dispersed knowledge and information 
necessary to solve the problem of efficient resource allocation, however the 
free market provided such a mechanism through the price mechanism. Prices 
signalled dispersed information to the myriad producers and consumers 
throughout the market. As long as allocative decisions were left to an 
unrestricted market the consequences of its function were by definition the 
most efficient outcomes. More importantly for Hayek there was no further 
independent criterion such as the general happiness or the public interest 
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against which market allocations could be assessed, as the formation of these 
criteria would either need to be self evident or themselves the product of 
some decision making process that pooled the dispersed information of all 
those concerned. And given that a government could not provide such an 
efficient allocation it would have to impose an arbitrary one. That is why 
even the well-meaning desires of western social democrats left us on the 
road to totalitarian serfdom. In this way Hayek’s critique of non market 
based distributive principles mirrors Michael Oakeshott’s criticism of the 
consequences of rationalism in politics, namely it imposes an arbitrary and 
partial political settlement on the complex of individual social and political 
decisions. Governing parties, however, well-meaning could not by definition 
know the best way to structure outcomes that could only be revealed through 
the price mechanism and would therefore have to rely on their own arbitrary 
prescriptions. These prescriptions would have no obvious normative 
authority other than that they reflected the interests of the groups holding 
political power. And it is for this reason that Hayek adopts a classical liberal 
scepticism about the state as a source of social justice or a guide to the good 
life. His argument appears to reflect Mill’s concern about the way the state 
can be colonised by social and political interests masquerading as moral and 
political experts. However, Hayek’s argument is stronger than Mill’s in that 
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Mill does at least allow that there can be such moral and political experts 
even if we have difficulty selecting them from groups who make bogus 
claims to be experts, such as religious authorities. For Hayek’s stronger 
claim is that there could not be such experts as they would have to have 
some way of collating and processing dispersed knowledge and information 
in the same way that markets do and the epistemological analysis of the 
market renders that prospect impossible.  
 
It is precisely because Mill seems to allow for the prospect of moral 
expertise that those influenced by Hayek’s arguments are suspicious of his 
arguments. Mill acknowledged that the state could be colonised by sectional 
or sinister interests, but he always held out the prospect that some group 
could emerge that would indeed be able to offer its expertise to rule wisely 
and efficiently. This suspicion was compounded by Mill’s abandonment of 
classical liberal orthodoxy over the matter of economic distribution. For 
Hayekians, Mill’s distinction between questions of production and 
distribution is simply a mistake and failed to acknowledge the ways in which 
distributive decisions of markets were themselves important indicators of 
dispersed knowledge. To remove distributive decisions for the nexus of 
market decision-making would both distort the epistemological function of 
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markets and interpose an arbitrary and normatively groundless political 
decision in their stead.  
 
This Hayekian brand of epistemological liberalism persists in contemporary 
political philosophy, most recently in Chandran Kukathas’ contribution to 
the debate about multiculturalism. For Kukathas, the attempt to impose a 
conception of group solidarity on the diverse cultural groups in modern 
liberal societies is to assume that one model of cultural integration can be 
distinguished from the myriad values and beliefs of such groups. Even 
liberal norms of equality would themselves form partial impositions on the 
diversity of society that emerges from the market in beliefs practices and 
values. For Kukathas an appropriate response to societal diversity in a robust 
form of benign neglect, whereby groups are able to get on with what they do 
in their own terms, with the only condition being that they do not prevent the 
physical exit of members who no longer wish to accept the associative 
obligations of group membership. Groups are not required to make exit easy, 
but as long as they do not prevent it by imprisoning members or putting 
physical obstacles in the way of members they should be left to do as they 
wish.  
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Kukathas’s classical liberal vision of multiculturalism owes much to 
Hayek’s argument and differs considerably from the kind of liberalism 
advocated by Mill. Yet in important respects it also illustrates how, Hayek’s 
more sceptical classical liberalism and his commitment to social 
epistemology runs into conflict with the Millian requirement to maintain 
epistemic diversity. 
 
For Mill, the maintenance epistemic diversity became a more pressing 
concern than the construction of a social or institutional epistemology. 
Epistemic diversity remained a good in itself as part of the conditions of 
social and political progress and was not primarily seen as a problem to be 
overcome in constructing a conception of the general interest. For Hayek, 
and for Kukathas, the epistemological argument remained the basis for 
liberalism. However the consequences of their epistemological approach is a 
more thorough going scepticism that in the end becomes self-undermining.  
 
In the case of Hayek’s argument there is no acknowledgement that markets 
can fail in their information-signalling role. He famously has a problem with 
the issue of the growth of monopolies and monopoly distortion of free 
markets and consequently the way in which markets can be sites of power 
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and influence as much as information signalling devices. This can be 
illustrated in the case of Kukathas’s Hayekian multiculturalism. Many 
minority cultural groups have sought group recognition and group specific 
rights and entitlements to defend themselves from the dominance of majority 
cultural practices. These provisions can be claimed as a matter of right when 
they are seen as a response to the coercive imposition of majority practices 
by former colonial states.23 The same argument might also be extended to 
decisions by minority linguistic communities to defend themselves against 
the consequences of economic and cultural globalisation. In the face of the 
dominant power of some cultures others become swamped and disappear. 
For Kukathas and presumably Hayek, this is a neutral process that follows 
the choices of individuals to choose the lives they prefer when confronted 
with alternatives. If everyone chooses Cocoa-coal, Macdonalds and MTV 
that will merely prove that they are genuinely more attractive than whatever 
is offered by minority communities. Cultural diversity is not a good in itself 
that should be coercively maintained, and to try and do so would be 
imposing one person or group’s controversial conception of what is valuable 
on everyone else. But one consequence of this laissez-faire approach is that 
Hayek and Kukathas’s strong epistemological scepticism potentially 
conflicts with epistemic diversity of the sort that Mill valued so highly, with 
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the consequence that a market of ideas and values of this sort might end up 
with only a very few perspectives surviving. Hayek’s market driven social 
and institutional epistemology potentially undercuts epistemic diversity 
because unlike Mill it only acknowledges government or the state as a 
distorting institution. As long as the state is not interfering intervening in 
market decisions then these will serve their appropriate epistemological 
purpose. Yet Mill, acknowledged at the very beginning of On Liberty that 
government was not the only threat to liberty in all its guises but that social 
forces could also threaten social and political as well as epistemic diversity. 
Unlike Hayek’s epistemological argument for the market, Mill attaches no 
special epistemological authority to any institution, therefore his theory has 
no problem with the idea that dominant power can be exercised by economic 
interests just as much as social and political interests, and that these can 
undermine the epistemological function of the market. Mill would therefore 
be far from sanguine about Kukathas’s Hayekian disregard for cultural 
diversity in the face of economic globalisation. 
 
Hayek’s failure to acknowledge that a laissez-faire approach to markets 
might undermine the very epistemological defence of market institutions can 
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be contrasted with John Dewey’s more thoroughgoing approach to social 
epistemology. 
 
Where Hayek placed all his emphasis on the price mechanism as an 
information pooling and signalling device, Dewey directed his attention to 
democracy and its commitment to voting and speech and deliberation. In the 
process of democratic deliberation citizens were engaged in a large scale 
process of experimentation in which various proposed solutions to social and 
political problems are rehearsed and their potential consequences assessed.24  
In favouring deliberation Dewey draws on the idea of dispersed practical 
intelligence that is brought to bear through the cooperative engagement 
between citizens, representatives and state and bureaucratic functionaries. 
Democratic deliberation of this kind is also revisable in the light of 
disconfirmation and new evidence, so that policies that fail or do not work as 
expected can be changed. Deliberation is a discovery method and as with 
experimentalism in natural science, it is the method as much as the 
substantive beliefs generated by it that matters.  
 
Like Hayek and Mill, Dewey’s conception of practical intelligence involves 
the belief that knowledge and information is often unarticulated and widely 
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dispersed in society, it is not merely held by an educated intellectual and 
cultural elite. It is therefore important that all voices are heard and that no 
particular set of voices dominates discussion. For this reason Dewey’s 
experimentalist approach to deliberation is strongly connected with his idea 
of democratic equality. All voices should be included in the deliberative 
process in order for collective decision making to serve the knowledge 
gathering process of public deliberation. Every individual and social group 
has a distinct perspective that is important for genuine public deliberation. 
The exclusion of distortion of such views of voices is no different from the 
falsification of evidence in natural science, and it casts doubt on the view 
that the outcomes of democratic deliberation genuinely constitute the public 
interest.  
Dewey acknowledges the importance of democratising the state and 
developing further opportunities for voting and deliberation within state 
structures, but for he also acknowledged that for his ideal of democracy as 
social experiment to work it could not simply focus on such state structures. 
Instead Democracy requires that all individuals adopt the ethos of 
deliberation, experiment and recognition of diversity in all aspects of their 
civil lives. Democracy requires a democratic civil society as well as a legal 
and constitutional structure. And this involves the development and 
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nurturing of parties and associations that embody the claims of individuals 
and group members dispersed throughout society. It also involves a genuine 
ethos of toleration of diversity and openness to different opinions. This will 
require political control over groups and factions that try and distort free 
communication or who silence debate and deliberation because of their 
control of organs of the state or through the monopoly ownership in the 
press and media. Unlike Hayek, Dewey is prepared to see the outcomes of a 
free market in the press and media as great a potential threat to deliberation 
and social experimentation as state control. For Dewey, Randolph Hearst (or 
in our own day Rupert Murdoch) could be just a great a threat to Democracy 
through his monopoly control of opinion, as he could be an assistance to 
Democracy through holding the state to account. It is partly this aspect of 
Dewey’s thought that has made him attractive to contemporary thinkers.25 
Yet Dewey was also aware that Democratic deliberation could increase 
opportunities for conflict as well as knowledge gathering and information 
pooling. The Liberal character of his conception of democracy is often 
forcefully asserted in his writings: 
 
Intolerance, abuse, calling of names because of differences of opinion 
about religion or politics or business, as well as because of differences 
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of race, color, wealth or degree of culture are treason to the 
democratic way of life. For everything which bars freedom and 
fullness of communication sets up barriers that divide human being 
into sets and cliques, into antagonistic sects and factions, and thereby 
undermines the democratic way of life. Merely legal guarantees of the 
civil liberties of free belief, free expression, and free assembly are of 
little avail if in daily life freedom of communication, the give and take 
of ideas, facts, experiences, is choked by mutual suspicion, b y abuse, 
by fear and hatred.26 
 
In many ways, Dewey’s democratic philosophy mirrors aspects of Mill’s 
defence of epistemic diversity. Dewey is much more optimistic than Mill 
about democracy as a discovery procedure, but he is similarly concerned, in 
a way that Hayek is not, with the requirements of maintaining epistemic 
diversity. Dewey’s conception of practical intelligence requires both the idea 
of dispersed knowledge of what works and what does not. Failure, error and 
untruth remain important for Dewey just as they did for Mill, as error plays 
an important role in the progress of knowledge. 
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Yet given Dewey’s acknowledgement of social forces and institutions that 
can frustrate democracy, and his account of those values and beliefs that 
silence debate or recognition, such as differences over race, culture and 
religious belief, he has a problem accounting for terms of inclusion and 
principles that rule some beliefs and values into debate as part of legitimate 
diversity and those beliefs that fail to count as legitimate contributions to 
debate. For Dewey, unlike Mill the solution to these problems is more 
democracy, but that seems to beg the question, as the problem faced in 
defending deliberative conceptions of democracy concerns deliberation 
amongst whom?27 
 
Unlike Dewey, Mill’s response to this problem is to opt for a liberal defence 
of epistemic diversity over a democratic social epistemology, and to rely on 
a non-democratic or non-deliberative account of the norms of inclusion that 
protect this account of epistemic diversity. For Mill, the non-deliberative 
account of the norm of inclusion is provided by his utilitarian theory and his 
utilitarian commitment to the principle of liberty. In other words Mill asserts 
the priority of philosophy over democracy. 
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Conclusion - Political Liberalism and the abandonment of 
epistemology? 
 
By way of conclusion we can see that contemporary political liberalism has 
abandoned the epistemological turn chosen by Hayek and Dewey and 
returned to a Liberal stance more closely associated with Mill’s scepticism 
about the merits of social epistemology. Liberal theory since the publication 
of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 1971, has deliberately avoided the 
preoccupation with social epistemology found in mid-century liberals such 
as Hayek or Dewey. This lack of interest in social epistemology and political 
liberalism’s more general ‘epistemic abstinence’28 might simply reflect an 
acknowledgement of the academic division of labour, whereby political 
philosophers such as Rawls focus on the justification of normative 
principles, whereas social scientists engage in the kinds of questions that 
Hayek or Dewey were concerned with. There is something in this idea and 
the related claims that Hayek became too much of a political philosopher 
and not enough of an economist, or that Dewey’s philosophy drew too 
eclectically from a variety of disciplines. Yet there is more to the argument 
than recognition of the claims of economics, social psychology and 
empirical political science.  
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The abandonment of epistemology embodied in the political liberal 
aspiration to provide a neutral defence of liberal principles, involves not just 
the recognition of the difficulty of establishing consensus around a particular 
conception of the good.29 It also involves a recognition of the fact of social 
and epistemic diversity, and the undesirability of eradicating it, even though 
Rawls like Mill is not committed to conceding the truth or rightness of any 
or all current conceptions of the good held in a plural liberal society.  
 
Of course, this does not mean that anything goes. Maintaining diversity 
involves the distribution of sets of rights, liberties and bundles of resources 
that enables individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good. In this 
respect Rawlsian political liberalism is consistent with both Mill and Dewey, 
though not Hayek.  However, where contemporary political liberalism 
departs from the epistemological liberalism of Dewey or contemporary 
deliberative democrats influenced by him, is in the Millian commitment to 
the primacy of liberal political philosophy over democracy.  In this respect 
contemporary political liberalism, like Mill’s utilitarian liberalism, remains 
wedded to the priority of normative political philosophy over epistemology. 
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This remains one of its greatest strengths and one of its most formidable 
challenges. 
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